Competition & opportunity by Richard N. Cooper & Jane Little
16 Regional Review Q3 2001
u.s. monetary policy has
a purely domestic mandate.
According to the Federal Re-
serve Act, the Fed’s mission is
to promote “maximum (sus-
tainable) employment, price
stability and moderate, long-
term interest rates” within the
United States. Still, global de-
velopments often have a significant influence on policy deci-
sions. As the U.S. economy has become more tightly linked
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promoting U.S. price stability and sustainable growth have in-
creasingly required taking global trends into account. Usually,
these developments are taken as “givens,” inputs into the data
set on which policy decisions are based. More rarely, interna-
tional developments, like an international liquidity crisis or a
period of dollar weakness, have elicited a Fed policy response
aimed at influencing the course of these “external” events — al-
ways with the intent of improving the long-term outcome for
the U.S. economy.
In addition, however, since World War II, international pres-
sures have played an important, if generally unrecognized, role
in the evolution of the U.S. banking system and, thus, the prac-
tice of U.S. monetary policy. In particular, U.S. and foreign
banks have frequently been able to avoid costly domestic bank-
ing rules by taking advantage of the gaps between national reg-
ulatory systems. In some cases, for example, domestic bank-
ing law simply did not cover foreign bank operations or new
products denominated in foreign currencies. Seeking to exploit
these loopholes, financial firms invented new types of accounts
or found ways to engage in previously prohibited activities.
These efforts then forced regulators to try to close the gaps or,
at least, to “level the playing field” for foreign and domestic
banks and for banks that could afford foreign operations and
those that could not. In doing so, regulators tried to walk a thin
line between safeguarding the integrity of the U.S. financial sys-
tem and of U.S. policy decisions and ensuring that U.S. regu-
lations did not place U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage
in an increasingly global market. 
The result: Foreign opportunities and foreign competition
— among regulators as well as firms — helped drive structur-
al change in the U.S. financial system over the past 40 years.
The development of the Eurodollar market and the role of for-
eign banks in breaking down the barriers to interstate banking
and the provisions separating investment from commercial
banking represent examples of how global forces helped spur
the evolution of the U.S. financial system. The resulting finan-
cial innovations and changes in banking regulation have, in
turn, affected how the Fed conducts monetary policy.
THE EURODOLLAR MARKET
The Eurodollar market was one of the first important financial
innovations of the post-World War II era. The Eurodollar mar-
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Banking Act (Glass-Steagall Act)
Separated commercial banks from investment
banks, prohibiting commercial banks from own-
ing brokerage firms or engaging in most invest-
ment banking activities. 
Bank Holding Company Act
(Spence-Robertson Act)
Established comprehensive regulations for bank
holding companies, which were now required to
register with the Federal Reserve Board.
Prohibited a bank holding company from acquir-
ing a bank located in another state, unless
specifically authorized by the host state (Douglas
Amendment).
Interest Equalization Tax
Tax on foreign stocks, bonds, and long-term
loans that was meant to discourage U.S. resi-
dents from lending abroad.
Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program
Suggested limitations on loans and investments
in order to discourage U.S. banks from lending to
foreigners and from investing abroad.
International Banking Act
Brought foreign banks within the federal regula-
tory framework, imposing the same reserve
requirements, interest rate ceilings, deposit
insurance requirements, and interstate banking
restrictions for foreign banks operating in the
United States as for domestic banks.
Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act
Lifted ceilings on the interest rates that banks
could offer their customers and authorized inter-
est-bearing transaction accounts. 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act
Repealed McFadden Act of 1927. Allowed inter-
state banking by way of branch acquisition.
States permitted to both veto acquisitions and
authorize new branches at will.
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act
Repealed Banking Act of 1933. Allowed affilia-
tions between commercial banks and securities
firms, insurance firms, and merchant banks.
Prohibited nonfinancial companies from owning
commercial banks, however.
Note: Included are only highlights from selected
pieces of legislation.
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ket is the wholesale market for large, dollar-de-
nominated deposits placed at banks outside of
the United States. The freedom from national
banking regulation provided by this market led
to major changes in the U.S. banking system,
including the end of interest rate ceilings on
bank deposits, a diminished role for reserve re-
quirements, and the creation of money market
accounts.
The Eurodollar market sprang up in the mid
1950s because Soviet banks feared that the U.S.
government would seize their U.S. dollar bal-
ances if they kept these deposits in the United
States; instead, they arranged to hold dollar-de-
nominated deposits at banks in London and
Paris. Other early customers included Italian
banks that borrowed and lent dollars to dodge
the cartel that ruled lending in lire, and British
banks seeking to finance non-Commonwealth
trade after the U.K. government restricted for-
eign loans in sterling during the Suez War and the ensuing ster-
ling crisis. 
But it wasn’t until the 1960s that the growth of the Eurodol-
lar market really took off. Much to the consternation of offi-
cials on both sides of the Atlantic, the U.S. dollar came under
considerable downward pressure in foreign exchange markets
throughout the 1960s. Since the Bretton Woods agreement to
maintain fixed exchange rates was still in effect, governments
with weak currencies were expected to limit the supply of their
currency in the foreign exchange market. Accordingly, from
1963 to 1969, the U.S. authorities instituted the Voluntary For-
eign Credit Restraint Program and other measures to restrict
U.S. investors from lending dollars abroad. These restrictions,
in effect, drove U.S. banks and foreign borrowers to the Eu-
rodollar market. 
Once in the Eurodollar market, U.S. banks, foreign bor-
rowers, and U.S. firms wanting to build plants overseas all dis-
covered the advantages of operating beyond the reach of cost-
ly central bank regulation. In the early days of the market, U.S.
reserve requirements and Regulation Q interest rate ceilings did
not apply to these dollar deposits at foreign banks, including
overseas offices of U.S. banks. And neither did foreign bank
regulations, which generally covered assets and liabilities in do-
mestic currency only. Thus, the banks could afford to offer
higher interest rates on dollar deposits than they could in the
United States, and borrowers could obtain dollar funding that
would otherwise have been unavailable to them. By permit-
ting transactions that could not have occurred in its absence,
the Eurodollar market proved highly advantageous to the large
banks able to operate on both sides of the Atlantic as well as to
their large customers. 
U.S. regulators grew more concerned about the freedoms
provided by the Eurodollar market in the late 1960s. At that
time, the Fed tightened monetary policy to fight inflation and
market interest rates rose above those permitted by Reg. Q in-
terest rate ceilings. For example, while the ceiling for savings
accounts was 4 percent in 1969, rates on 3-month Treasury bills
were approaching 7 percent. Under these constraints, the U.S.
banks faced a serious runoff of funds from their domestic of-
fices. As a result, they began to borrow large sums from the un-
regulated Eurodollar market to replace them. Fearing these Eu-
rodollar borrowings might undermine policy and wanting to
remove the “special advantage” enjoyed by large banks with
ready access to the Eurodollar market, the Board of Governors
instituted a reserve requirement of 10 percent on any increase
in member bank Eurodollar borrowings above a base amount.
Still, at the end of 1969, big U.S. commercial banks had bor-
rowed enough Eurodollars (about $13 billion) to largely offset
the runoff of domestic deposits subject to interest rate ceilings.
Later, during yet another period of dollar weakness but rela-
tively low U.S. interest rates, the Board raised the marginal re-
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serve requirement on Eurodollar borrowings still higher. Since
the reserve-free base fell as the banks repaid their Eurodollar
loans, this time raising reserve requirements was meant to dis-
courage the banks from repaying their Eurodollar debts and
adding to the downward pressures on the dollar. But once
again, market forces prevailed, and the episode ended with the
banks having paid down their Eurodollar debt and the Fed hav-
ing reduced reserve requirements on Eurodollar liabilities. 
Even while it was trying to use reserve requirements to con-
trol the size and steer the direction of Eurodollar flows (with
limited success), the Fed was also sensitive to the U.S. banks’
need to compete in the Eurodollar market. Accordingly, in 1977,
the Board reduced the reserve requirement on Eurodollar funds
lent by a foreign branch of a member bank to a U.S. borrower
to let these branches compete with foreign banks not subject
to such requirements. The Fed also found a way to let U.S.
banks participate in the Eurodollar market without the expense
of setting up a London branch by approving the establishment
of “Nassau shells” in 1969. These shell offices in the Bahamas
were generally little more than a brass plate, a bookkeeper, and
a set of accounts, but they allowed U.S. banks to do business
under Eurodollar rules while performing the bulk of the relat-
ed activity at the U.S. head office. In 1981, the Board went a
step further and approved the creation of International Bank-
ing Facilities (IBFs), a set of segregated ac-
counts that still provide a way for U.S. de-
pository institutions and other corporations to
accept large time deposits from foreign resi-
dents free of reserve requirements and inter-
est rate ceilings.
In 1970, the large negotiable CD was freed
from interest rate ceilings, in part to increase
this domestic instrument’s ability to compete
with Eurodollar deposits. Once the two big fi-
nancial innovations of the 1960s — the Eu-
rodollar and the large negotiable CD — al-
lowed investors with $100,000 to earn interest
rates higher than those available to small de-
positors, the small investors began to pressure
financial institutions to find ways around in-
terest rate ceilings for them, too. In 1970, an
innovative Massachusetts savings bank in-
troduced the Negotiable Order of Withdraw-
al or NOW account — in effect, a (limited)
checking account that paid interest. Similar-
ly, in 1977 a handful of brokerage houses and
banks cooperated to create the money mar-
ket account, another transactions account
earning a market rate of interest. 
In the end, these efforts to escape interest rate ceilings and
reserve requirements contributed to the passage of the Depos-
itory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in
1980. Among other important changes, this act required a
phaseout of the interest rate ceilings that had dominated the
U.S. banking sector for half a century (see the sidebar on Reg.
Q) and created the money market deposit, which let banks com-
pete with brokerage houses offering similar accounts. In addi-
tion, reserve requirements on Eurodollar liabilities and com-
peting time deposits have been set to zero since the early 1980s.
FOREIGN COMPETITION AND THE MOVE TO
INTERSTATE BANKING
Interstate banking is another area where competition from for-
eign banks has served as a catalyst for change in the U.S. bank-
ing system — in this instance, primarily in the early stages of
the process. The prohibition against interstate banking became
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a hallmark of the U.S. banking system with the passage of the
McFadden Act in 1927. This prohibition reflected Americans’
traditional fear of “national moneyed trusts” and a pragmatic
desire on the part of small banks and their political supporters
to protect local banking interests.
But foreign banks were not covered by this prohibition. In-
deed, foreign banks operating in the United States remained
unregulated at the national level until 1978 and, therefore, had
a competitive advantage over U.S. banks in being able to es-
tablish a full presence in more than one state. Moreover, dur-
ing the 1970s a number of states began encouraging foreign
banks to establish branches and agencies within their borders
in order to support the international trade and investment ac-
tivities of firms located in their state. Because most small- to
mid-sized banks had limited experience in providing interna-
tional banking services, state legislators viewed the foreign
banks’ presence as complementary rather than competitive.
By 1978, 63 of the 122 foreign banks operating in this coun-
try already had facilities in more than one state, noted G.
William Miller, then Fed chairman. Of these, 31 banks were op-
erating in three or more states, a number that most observers
expected to grow since additional states had passed legislation
allowing branches or agencies of foreign banks to begin oper-
ations. Three large foreign banks with multistate facilities had
also announced an intention to acquire a large domestic bank.
Forty-five of these foreign banks had worldwide assets of more
than $10 billion and thus were comparable with the largest do-
mestically chartered banks. In supporting the passage of the In-
ternational Banking Act (IBA), Chairman Miller argued that
it was incongruous that foreign banks could operate in this
country without being subject to the rules of the central bank.
And it was unfair to domestic banks (and inconsistent with the
favored principle of national treatment) that foreign banks be
allowed to continue to expand across state lines. 
When the IBA was passed in 1978, it required foreign banks
operating a federally or state-chartered branch or agency to pick
a home state. Existing branches outside of that state were grand-
fathered, while additional branches could only be set up under
the same rules that would apply to a domestic bank — that is,
so long as it was welcome in the host state and all of its busi-
ness was related to foreign commerce. In effect, these branch-
PERATE IN MORE THAN ONE
DOWN THE RESTRICTIONS THAT
FROM CROSSING STATE LINES
es were meant to function like the limited-purpose Edge Act
corporations that national banks had been permitted to estab-
lish in New York and other financial centers to conduct inter-
national banking since 1919.
Perhaps more significantly, the IBA also allowed these Edge
Act corporations to branch interstate. (This provision was ad-
vantageous because allowing an existing Edge to branch re-
quires less capital than setting up a new Edge Corp.) As a re-
sult, as of 1978 domestically chartered commercial banks could
in effect establish a national branch network — so long as they
limited these branches to providing banking services related
to international trade. For a time, these Edge corporations be-
came a favored way for some of the large U.S. banks to step
across state lines. 
Once again, then, foreign competition helped to provoke ear-
ly changes in the domestic status quo. While most analysts be-
lieve that the high failure rates of geographically constrained
banks and thrifts in the 1980s made interstate banking accept-
able in the 1990s, the fusion of national and global financial mar-
kets had helped pave the way. By 1993, most states were al-
lowing bank holding companies to cross state boundaries, and
several permitted interstate branching by state banks that were
not members of the Federal Reserve System. Many argue that,
by the time the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branch-
ing Efficiency Act was passed in 1994 to allow bank holding
companies to acquire banks in any state and, as of 1997, to al-
low banks to merge across state lines, the legislation was large-
ly unneeded; interstate banking already existed.
THE DEMISE OF GLASS-STEAGALL 
In a similar fashion, competition from foreign banks con-
tributed to the demise of the Glass-Steagall provisions that had
long separated commercial from investment banking. Foreign
banks usually operate in a more permissive regulatory envi-
ronment than do U.S. banks, and U.S. regulators have gener-
ally been quite sensitive to U.S. banks’ need to compete over-
seas. Accordingly, the Fed’s Regulation K has allowed U.S.
banks operating abroad to engage in activities not permitted
within the United States. For instance, foreign branches of U.S.
banks were allowed to underwrite the debt obligations of the
host country, to act as an insurance agent or broker, and, with
Fed approval, to engage in other activities connected with the
business of banking in the foreign country. 
In the case of foreign bank operations in this country, U.S.
law and U.S. regulators have taken the view that prohibiting all
activities allowed abroad but not permitted to U.S. banks might
be unnecessarily harmful to the foreign banks. For this reason,
under certain circumstances, foreign banks have been allowed
to conduct any business in the United States, such as invest-22 Regional Review Q3 2001
ment banking, that is “incidental” to their business outside the
United States.
In this way, the greater leniency granted U.S. banks abroad,
together with the broader scope permitted to foreign banks op-
erating in the United States, contributed to broadening the
range of business activities permitted to all banks operating in
this country. Indeed, by the late 1990s some observers had come
to believe that the repeal of Glass-Steagall was no longer nec-
essary, given the flexibility with which the authorities were
defining “permissible” activities, notes Carl Felsenfeld in Bank-
ing Regulations in the United States. Yet, in 1999, when the Sen-
ate Banking Committee asked Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
to comment on proposed legislation to remove the legal im-
pediments to the integration of banking, insurance, and secu-
rities activities, he strongly endorsed the need for change.
Greenspan emphasized that U.S. financial institutions compete
in global financial markets and noted that “archaic barriers to
efficiency” could “undermine the competitiveness of our fi-
nancial institutions . . . and, ultimately, the global dominance
of American finance.”
FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND THE EVOLUTION
OF MONETARY POLICY ANCHORS 
As the innovations and regulatory changes described above
took shape, the traditional relationships between various mea-
sures of the money supply and inflation began to break down.
In the early 1980s, with the introduction of money market de-
posits and sweep accounts, among other innovations, the fre-
quently redefined monetary aggregates
like M1 (basically currency plus various
types of checking accounts) and M2 (M1
plus small savings and time deposits) be-
came increasingly unstable and hard to
predict. 
M1 had been a favored target for mon-
etary policy, particularly during the late
1970s and early 1980s, because it was
thought to have a relatively close relation-
ship to economy-wide spending and was
easily influenced by Fed policy. Before
deregulation, targeting M1 appeared at-
tractive largely because laws prohibited
checking accounts from earning interest,
and other types of accounts could not
offer checking privileges. These differ-
ences forced depositors to keep all the
money they intended to spend in the near
future in checking accounts while en-
couraging them to minimize these non-interest-bearing trans-
action balances. But when deregulation and financial innova-
tion led to checking accounts that paid interest, and it became
possible to write checks on other types of deposits, the divi-
sion between the various monetary aggregates broke down.
“Small changes in interest rates caused individuals to move in
or out of M1, which, in turn, led to substantial swings in the ag-
gregate’s growth rate that had little to do with individual spend-
ing plans,” San Francisco Fed researchers Bharat Trehan and
Kelly Ragan pointed out in 1998. As the growth rates of the var-
ious Ms turned unstable, targeting any particular monetary ag-
gregate became a far less effective way of conducting mone-
tary policy.
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By July 1983, Frank Morris, then president of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Boston, was arguing that no targets should be
set for M1 and M2 because they were no longer “predictably
related to nominal GDP.” He argued that it would be far bet-
ter to target broader aggregates, such as total liquid assets or to-
tal domestic nonfinancial debt.
In time, Morris’s views came to be widely shared. By the ear-
ly 1990s, the Federal Open Market Committee was warning the
Congress and the public regularly that the monetary aggregates
were unreliable guides for policy. Finally, in August 1995, the
FOMC changed the wording of its domestic policy directive to
the New York Fed to include a specific target for the Fed funds
rate, the overnight interbank lending rate. This change clari-
fied the fact that the FOMC had actually been targeting the Fed
funds rate, rather than any of the Ms, for some time.
CONCLUSION
Foreign competition and foreign opportunities resulting from
gaps between national regulatory frameworks have provoked
substantial change in the structure of the U.S. financial system.
These external forces were an important factor in breaking
down the geographical and business barriers that had shaped
the U.S. banking system since the 1930s. They also led to im-
portant financial innovations that required major changes in the
regulations governing U.S. banks. These innovations, in turn,
affected how monetary policy works in this and other coun-
tries since many of the new types of accounts blurred the dis-
tinctions between the monetary aggregates and made them in-
creasingly poor guides for policy. The ensuing search for a
substitute has led many central banks, in the United States and
abroad, to choose short-term interest rates as their operational
target. Others have adopted a specific inflation target, choos-
ing to highlight what they view as the central bank’s ultimate
goal. Which is the better approach? Once again, foreign forces
will likely help shape the future conduct of U.S. monetary pol-
icy as policymakers here and abroad observe the outcomes of
their differing national experiments. S
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nterest rate ceilings on bank deposits loomed
large on the U.S. banking landscape for over
fifty years. The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935
prohibited commercial banks from paying inter-
est on demand deposits (that is, checking accounts) and
allowed the Fed to set ceilings — via Regulation Q — on
interest paid on time and savings accounts. This legislation
reflected a widespread belief that the bank failures during
the Great Depression had resulted from excessive competi-
tion. Supposedly, high interest costs and low profit margins
drove banks to make high-yield but risky investments. In
addition, the Congress thought that limiting interest rates
would encourage country banks to lend more in their local
communities.
The ceilings were not binding until the mid 1960s, as
market interest rates remained well below the Reg. Q limits.
But in 1966 inflation began to pick up, the Fed tightened pol-
icy, and unregulated interest rates on assets like Treasury
securities rose above those permitted by Reg. Q for bank
deposits. At the time, policymakers were very concerned that
investment funds were flowing disproportionately toward
business investment rather than into mortgage lending.
Thus, they extended Reg. Q to cover the thrifts (the savings
banks and savings and loan associations) but imposed
slightly higher ceilings on these institutions because they tra-
ditionally specialized in mortgage lending. The lawmakers
thought that doing so would let the thrifts attract more
deposits. Instead, both the banks and the thrifts faced a
runoff of funds into assets, like Treasury securities and com-
mercial paper, with unregulated interest rates. 
Facing a loss of deposits every time interest rates rose,
the commercial banks sought to work around the restric-
tions. Aside from turning to the Eurodollar market and other
unregulated markets to raise funds, commercial banks also
started enticing U.S. depositors by offering them a variety of
gifts, to compete in areas other than interest rates. The ceil-
ings harmed low-income savers disproportionately. Wealthy
depositors could shift their deposits to unregulated invest-
ments and, after 1970, deposits of $100,000 or more were
exempt from Reg. Q. “According to some studies, small
savers lost several billion dollars in interest earnings as a
result of Regulation Q ceilings,” R. Alton Gilbert of the St.
Louis Fed pointed out in 1986. 
By the late 1970s, it was clear that Reg. Q was not pro-
ducing the desired results. Money market mutual funds had
become major competitors with banks and thrifts for small
investment accounts. And Reg. Q was not increasing the
supply of funds for mortgages. If anything, it was making
mortgage lending more sensitive to the business cycle. In
1980, Congress passed the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, which began the
phase-out of the interest rate ceilings. By 1986, all Reg. Q
ceilings had been eliminated. 
i
The birth and death of Regulation Q